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Constitutional Treatment of Hate
Speech and Freedom of Expression:
a Canada – U.S. perspective
Pyeng Hwa Kang
1  Among Western nations sharing a frontier, no countries appear as congeneric as the
Canadian-American pair. In broad terms, Canada and the U.S. today share a wide range
of resemblances in culture, history, language, and to a great extent, political regimes of
democratic governmental systems2. That bonhomie is extended to the recognition of
freedom  of  expression  in  the  respective  legal  systems.  The  First  Amendment’s
sophisticated elaboration of what are now de facto considered as the classic free speech
paradigms3 –  and  its  staunch  defense  of  the  freedom  -  has  earned  it  a  notorious
reputation,  effectively making it  a  kind of a mecca of  any in-depth legal  studies of
freedom of expression. 
2  Of course, America does not stand alone when it comes to the constitutional embrace of
the free speech ideal. Canada too, has long established that freedom of expression “is
the  matrix,  the  indispensable  condition  of  nearly  every  other  freedom”4.
Notwithstanding  its  enshrinement  in  s.2(b)  of  the  Canadian  Charter  of  Rights  and
Freedoms5, there is a widely accepted acknowledgement of the freedom being “one of
the fundamental concepts that has formed the basis for the historical development of
the political, social, and educational institutions of Western society”6. 
3  In sum, there is an undeniable sense of general congeniality between the two nations in
their  positive  reconnaissance of  the freedom. This  deep-rooted appreciation on both
legal and socio-political grounds - along with other constitutional values such as right
to due process, freedom of religion, of association, and of the press - has propelled the
pair hand in hand as leading flag bearers of vibrant democracy. After all, the right to
freely opine  one’s  opinions  –  political  ones  in  particular  –  and  their  unhindered
circulation in any given social environment, constitutes the essence, the bloodline for a
performing democracy; in case of that inability, the dawning of an authoritarian State




4  Notwithstanding this basic agreement, important distinctions remain7. One such area
concerns the dilemma of hate speech. The legal conundrum surrounding the question
of  a  legitimate  suppression  of  hate  speech  by  the  State  has  become  remarkably
poignant following the American political bouleversement in 2016 and the burgeoning of
mean-spiritedness  in  social  atmosphere  not  only  prevalent  in  the  North  American
scenery8. In that process, hate speech that fundamentally vilifies the racial, ethnic or
religious  characteristics  –  grosso  modo,  the cultural  identity9 –  of  the  Others has  re-
emerged  as  a  hairy  quandary  to  Western  societies  that  take  pride  in  the  liberal
tradition of tolerance. 
5  This article discusses the constitutional treatment of hate speech vis-à-vis freedom of
expression  from  the  Canadian  and  American  perspective.  Given  the  monumental
amount  of  previous  scholarly  writings  in  the  periphery  of  the  subject,  the  natural
challenge arising thereof is that of parroting or redundancy10. Thus, to narrowly tailor
the aim and the scope of the article, I focus on two major points which I perceive as the
most  diverging  aspects  with  regard  to  the  legal  handling  of  hate  speech  on
constitutional level in respective legal orders: first, on the conceptual divergence to the
freedom of expression as fundamental freedom and the extent of that recognition with
respect to other constitutional  rights;  second,  on the respective key jurisprudential
evolutions and differing legal  basis  in evaluating the constitutional  validity of  legal
restrictions of hate speech. The argument of the article is twofold: I  argue that the
American  conception of  free  speech as  a  preferred  freedom is  necessarily  built  on
strong originalist constitutional interpretation and shaped by socio-cultural context of
its history. The Canadian approach to freedom of expression, on the other hand, rejects
a  hierarchical  system  of  fundamental  rights  but  rather  applies  an  egalitarian
conception of rights relationally and with respect to other conflicting rights (1°). It is
my observation, based on landmark decisions specifically addressing group vilifying
hate  speech,  that  Canadian  courts  have  not  been  hesitant  to  strike  down such
expressions. Their legal justifications lie on expansive, communitarian interpretations
of  harm in  hateful  words  -  harm that  which is  perceived as  antithetical  to  group-
oriented, multicultural values reflective of Canada’s pluralistic vision. The American
counterparts  have  been  far  more  reluctant  in  this  regard  by  applying  strict  First
Amendment scrutiny (2°).  My hope is  that  at  the end of  these demonstrations,  the
subtle yet disparate juridical identity of Canadian freedom of expression through its





6  The American free speech enjoys a particular favoritism in the American constitutional
life.  It  is  a  juriscultural product  that  was historically  forged by a  constant alertness
against governmental intrusion on the fundamental freedom and its abidance to the
originalist interpretation of the First Amendment (A). Canada, however, has declined to
rank the same freedom above other equally fundamental rights, effectively creating an






7  If there is one word befitting to describe the place free speech occupies in the echelon
of  American  constitutional  life,  it  is  that  of  exceptionalism.  Indeed,  speech  as
fundamental freedom enjoys an unmatched proclivity by American law. 
8  Take for example the “online epidemic”11 of fake news as (false) political speech and
the  associated  legal  conundrum  reining  in  such  speech12.  Beyond  the  proximate
concern that empowering the government to regulate political  speech would be an
open invitation to abuse13,  courts have vehemently refused to impose constraint on
expressions of political  nature14.  Assuredly,  political  speech, as “the essence of self-
government”15, is beneficiary of the staunchest legal protection because the “discussion
of political affairs lies at the heart of the First Amendment”16.  It is in fact explicitly
recognized and even encouraged by the U.S.  Supreme Court that public  debates on
important issues take place as they are “integral  to the operation of  the system of
government”17. To that end, the “unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about
of political  and social  changes desired by the people”18 is,  as a prerequisite for any
democratic system, that which must be constitutionally ensured. To guarantee the kind
of “breathing room”19 for political debates, the argument continues, political speech,
even  false,  must be  protected.20 In  United  States  v.  Alvarez21 for  instance,  the  U.S.
Supreme  Court  held  that  untruthful  expression  be  given  the  same  constitutional
protection  as  truthful  statement  even  if  it  was  an  intentional  doing22.  This
extraordinary degree of  protection granted to political  speech23 may appear almost
outlandish  to  even  America’s  closest  Western  allies  of  democratic  ideals.  In  fact,
America remains to this day the sole country that has yet to adopt a comprehensive
legal regime to suppress hateful speech (or fake news for that matter) in major Western
nations24. 
9  One of the natural questions that arises from this peculiar stance is that of the absolute
character  of  free  speech.  This  question  has,  in  its  subtlety,  contributed  to  an
interpretation in strong favor of free speech. An attempt to answer that question is
located  in  the  structuration  of  the  First  Amendment  itself.  It  reads  in  part,  “the
Congress shall pass no law … abridging the freedom of speech”25. The said Amendment
does not offer any distinction nor elaborate on any possible legal circumstances that
would  trigger  the  passage  of  a  law  by  the  legislative  body  limiting  the  freedoms
mentioned therein. The Amendment flatly forbids the congress from taking any actions
placing  a  cap  on  the  rudimentary  freedoms.  Some  former  Supreme  Court  Justices
adhered to this originalist interpretation, taking that “no law” literally meant “no law”
at all. In his dissenting opinion in Beauharnais v. Illinois26, Justice Douglas found that the
First Amendment rights are “couched in absolute terms”27. Justice Black was another
fervent believer of this absolutist position. In particular, he tenaciously defended free
speech  as  a  bedrock  principle  that  cannot  be  compromised  against  any  ostensible
excuses for safeguarding government interests28. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire29, this
absolutist  view  was  somewhat  refuted  with  the  Court  narrating  a  number  of
exceptional instances in which speech would not fall under the protective ambit of the
First Amendment30.  Still, U.S. courts have been adamant if not extremely reticent to
restrain speech activity, an attitude that was reinforced through a number of landmark
jurisprudential  developments  that  resulted  in  denouncements  of  overbroad  laws




may  have  eroded,  it  is  unquestionable  that  free  speech  enjoys  an unequivocal
sentiment of predilection in American constitutional references. Free speech was, and
continues to be, the first of the American freedoms. 
10  If this originalist interpretation of the First Amendment has crowned free speech as the
favorite  son  among  other  liberties  consecrated  in  the  American  Constitution,  this
unique propensity is to a great extent owed to the historical cultivation of overzealous
skepticism against government32 - a defining trait of American jurisculture33. From the
conception of the nation to post-colonial era to modern times (some periods naturally
more intensely than others), there has been a simmering attitude of suspicion against
governmental intrusion upon the fundamental liberties of its citizens34. After all, the
term means quite just that: free speech. It should come as no surprise then, as to why
the particular formulation of  the term ‘free speech’  has outlasted the tides of  time
when virtually all other legal references in Western constitutional systems have settled
on the more general wording of ‘freedom of expression’. Free speech has thus not only
stuck as a permanent fixture in American constitutional life, but saw its stature extend
to the cultural domains transcending and undetachable to American nativist identity.
This  confrontational  model  has  had a  determinative  touch in the projection of  the
cultural  image of  free speech.  When considering the contentious,  defiant roles free
speech assumed in American history, it is graspable as to how and why it assumed a
uniquely flavored conception of the freedom that was later suitably referred to as the
“clash model”35.  The freedom is  an unrestricted good of and for the  people  and its
deprivation must be accompanied by pious compunction.
11  It is also no secret that this distinct American conception of speech freedom derives its
sources from the First Amendment paradigms, most notably those of marketplace of
ideas and personal autonomy36 – both of which are chained to individualistic liberal
customs:  one  should  be  allowed to  freely  choose  whichever  messages  they  wish to
purchase  from  the  marketplace,  and  this,  independently  from  any  government
supervision on the definition of good life. It ensues that the government’s rightful role
is thus that of respect of individuals’ autonomous agency. In other words, it is not up to
the government to cherry-pick which speech passes or fails; it is rather the driving
forces  of  a  free  market,  the  competitive  spirit  within  the  pool  of  ideas  that  will
ultimately sort out the wheat from the chaff. No matter how controversial or upsetting
a speech’s content may be, the potential imposition of government-sponsored speech
regulation  outweighs  some  inconvenience  resulting  from  hate  speech37;  for  that
encroachment  –  even in  its  seemingly  harmless  disguise  of  concerned paternalistic
guidance - always presents a bigger threat to the freedom that will inevitably drag us
toward democracy’s slippery descent38. 
 
B/ - Canadian Freedom of Expression: An Egalitarian Model
12  When compared side by side with the rich historical roots and the celebrated tradition
of free speech in America, the image of Canadian freedom of expression can appear
rather vapid. After all, there may be some truth into the assumption that the Canadian
freedom of expression is not as aged as its counterpart in America39. One commentator
even  noted  that  the  Canadian  legal  treatment  of  freedom  of  expression  is  not  as
complex as that of the United States40. I don’t think the remark necessarily implies that
the Canadian constitutional tests of speech are a mere collection of haphazardry or




truism  that  the  most  ardent  defense  of  free  speech  was  conceived  in  the  First
Amendment jurisprudence’s doctrinal sophistication. And over the course of the last
decades, while not slavishly cloning the American path, Canada was attentive of the
hard-earned  lessons  from  America’s  experience  with  excessive  predilection  to
unmitigated  speech.  The  observation  has  helped  Canada’s  legal  minds  to  craft  an
egalitarian-oriented interpretation of the liberty. 
13  The first sign of divergence emerges in the Charter of rights and freedoms, the (modern)
Canadian  equivalent  of  the  American  Constitution.  In  stark  contrast  to  the  First
Amendment’s  seemingly  unnegotiable  tone  in  its  articulation,  the  Canadian  Charter
debuts in a distinctively different way. Section 1 of the Charter in fact commences with
the  constitutional  possibility  to  limit  the  fundamental  rights  even  before  they  are
proclaimed in the following section. The limit is  not a mere decorum as the test is
three-fold:  that  the  limit  be  (a)  lawful,  that  can  be  justified  in  a  (b)  free,  and  (c)
democratic society41. This limitation clause indicates that the absolutist perception of
rights  has  not  succeeded  to  create  a  foothold  on  the  Canadian  constitutional  soil.
Freedom of expression is no exception. As one commentator has noted, “Canada has
clearly  rejected  the  idea  of  absolute  principles”42.  Freedom  of  expression  is
fundamental but that does not gift it with absolute immunity when there are legitimate
“pressing  and substantial  concerns”43 that  may justify  its  inhibition.  This  denial  of
predisposition  to  speech  freedom  resonates  with  the  purposive  interpretation  of
judicial methodology that is undoubtedly Canadian. The relational alignment of rights
invites  that  “the  meaning  of  a  right  or  freedom  guaranteed  by  the  Charter (…)  be
understood (…) in the light of the interests it was meant to protect”44. When words are
that are uttered with the express intent of inflicting harm to others – especially those
belonging to minority groups – it is obvious that hate speech is incompatible to the
purposive spirit of the Charter. 
14  Further breaking point is clearly revealed when the freedom in question is balanced
with other fundamental rights. In case of Dagenais45, the Canadian Supreme Court came
to grapple with the standing of freedom of expression vis-à-vis another Charter right.
Although the  case  did  not  directly  involve  hate  speech,  it  is  very  telling  as  to  the
horizontal  attitude  Canada  has  embraced  in  rights-reconciling  operations.  In
considering whether the public airing and diffusion of materials that could inevitably
cause prejudice to an ongoing trial, the Canadian Supreme Court declined from ranking
one  Charter right  over  the  other.  The  Court  explicitly  noted  that  “a  hierarchical
approach to rights must be avoided,  both when interpreting the Charter and when
developing the common law”46. This resolute departure from the American counterpart
signaled the Court’s demiurgical willingness to establish a unique Canadian free speech
jurisprudence without turning the freedom itself into some ‘Trump card’ that should
reign  over  other  Charter rights.  The  Court  rejected  running  into  a  methodological
impasse of  having  to somehow  grade  the  supposed  status  of  constitutional  rights.
Instead, in a remarkable fashion, the Canadian approach generated a level-playing field
for  future  cases  where  Charter rights  will  collide.  Surely,  free  expression  is  a
fundamental  freedom  but  that  does  not  mean  it  should  enjoy  a  whole  different
categorization of its own. The Court thus distanced itself from the American narrative,
noting that the “clash model is more suited to the American constitutional context”47
but  not  the  Canadian  social  conditions.  Striking  a  conciliatory  rather  than  a




the public broadcasting of the series and the dissemination of related discussion on the
platform of public discourse – “should not always be seen as a clash between freedom
of expression for the media and the right to a fair trial for the accused”48, as was the




15  Canada’s  upholding  of  hate  propaganda  restrictions  is  strongly  grounded  on  a
communitarian understanding of the harms in hate speech. This expansive concept of
harm is consonant with Canada’s striving for the pluralistic vision of society that seeks
to  protect  collective  interests  and  multicultural  group  rights49 from  fundamentally
degrading speech (A). The American approach, however, has been for the most part
characterized by a strong reluctance in limiting speech freedom and has fortified that
abstentionist position through a narrowly developed set of criteria for justification of
speech restriction. This has resulted in a reductionist interpretation of harm, a view
that  is  wholly  inadequate  to  cover  the  sensibility  harms  purported  onto  varied
communities by hate speech (B).
 
A/ - Honoring Canada’s Communitarian commitment
16  If originalism remains a defining feature of American free speech and exceptionalism
its’ norm, the Canadian version of freedom of expression has been somewhat palliated
by an egalitarian-driven conceptualization of fundamental rights. In concrete terms,
this means Canada has been far from reluctant in reining in hate speech from running
rampant  in  civilized  society  no  matter  how  paramount  that  freedom  is.  Canadian
courts’  firm  stance  in  castigation  of  hate  speech  and  their  intrepid  interference
through judicial pronouncements derive their rationale, among numerous basis, from
the basic recognition of the harm the abuse of manipulated free expression can cause.
Beyond the obvious immediate psychological injury or physical distress to even long-
term  impairment  of  social  relationships  individual  victims  suffer  at  the  repetitive
exposure to hate speech50, Courts were steadfast to acknowledge that the corollary of
such expression ultimately undermines the equal standing and human dignity of its
intended audience. In particular, by perceiving extensively into the pervasive nature51
and mushrooming effect52 of this category of words, the Supreme Court of Canada has
remained hypervigilant  against  the destructive power of  hate speech to  create and
accumulate corrosive socio-political environment. This state of alertness against the
permanent danger in hate speech - and more precisely of its capacity to fan the flames
of incivility when left to flourish in the face of pusillanimity of the law - appears well
warranted  in  today’s context.  After  all,  the  current  phenomenon  of  hate  speech
operates largely in harmony with active seeding of disinformation and misinformation
and propagation of ‘cheap’ speech53 that together pollute the general stream of public
discourse, not only political debacles. 
17  To  that  end,  Canada  possesses  in  its  penal  inventory  specific  legal  provisions  that
restrict and punish the propagation of hate speech. Section 319 of the Criminal code
makes it an offence communicating expressions that publicly incite hatred (319-1)54 or




defense mechanisms56 are put in place to keep the scope of the targeted category of
speech narrow but nevertheless, it is an indictable offense punishable by imprisonment
to up to two years. Section 318(1) of the Criminal Code makes advocacy or promotion of
genocide an indictable offence that is punishable by imprisonment of up to five years57.
In addition, there are provincial human rights legislations that further keep a tight grip
on hate speech activity through its broad targeting of fundamentally discriminatory
behaviors58. 
18  The existence of such provisions that are specifically implemented to curtail hateful
utterances alone places Canada at odds with the U.S. But what is even more remarkable
–  and  that  which  further  distinguishes  from  the  American  approach  to  impugned
speech  -  has  been  the  legal  basis  on  which  Canadian  landmark  hate  speech
jurisprudences  relied  upon  to  banish  hate  speech  from  Canadian  soil.  As  Canada’s
criminal  hate  propaganda  restrictions  were  subsequently  put  to  the  constitutional
stands and their merit assessed against the inherent values of freedom of expression,
one decision after another delivered by the Supreme Court have been strongly rooted
in communitarian ground59 that sought to protect the collective interests of Canadian
society from the pugnaciousness of hate expression. 
19  The communitarian concern about the harmful effects induced by hate message is well
visible  in  R.  v.  Keegstra60,  a  leading  case  in  Canadian  hate  speech  jurisprudence.
Reaffirming the constitutional validity of a criminal provision61 that was called upon to
prosecute an Albertan high school teacher’s  spreading of nefarious views regarding
Jewish people to his own students, the ruling applied an expansive interpretation of the
harm in hate dissemination onto the communal interests of society. While recognizing
the direct  result  of  harm on individual  victims,  the Court  also saw the defendant’s
expression  as  constituting  an  assault  to  the  very  “sense  of  human  dignity  and
belonging  to  the  community”62.  Writing  for  the  majority,  Dickson  C.J.  explicitly
acknowledged that the accumulation of  the continual  “derision,  hostility and abuse
encouraged by hate propaganda … has a severely negative impact on” the target who
identifies with the associated group63.  The harm cuts that much deeper because “he
experiences attacks on the groups to which he belongs personally and sometimes very
deeply”64. 
20  This communitarian defense of hate speech prohibition is a partial reflection of a larger
vision embedded in Canada’s multicultural project.  By natural implication then, the
harm in hate speech is evaluated with the utmost seriousness because hate propaganda
of fundamentally degrading ideals is perceived as an affront on Canada’s ethnic mosaic
and “antithetical to (our) very system of freedom”65. The aspersion and the imputing
insinuation  contained  in  hate  message  may  cause  “serious  discord” 66 within  the
involved community if not outright acts of violence and discrimination that injures the
multicultural character of Canadian society at large. In Taylor v. Canadian Human Rights
Commission 67 too,  prohibiting  anti-Semitic  telephone  calls  was  deemed  as  a  wholly
justified limitation in the eyes of the Court to which the suppression of hate speech
presented an imperative in order to uphold “… the tolerance and open-mindedness
that must flourish in a multicultural society which is committed to the idea of equality”
68. Although the more recent case of Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott69
did bring acute refinement to  the definition of  hatred so as  to  narrowly tailor  the
general overbreadth of the terminology’s effective legal implication70 (which was the




line with its predecessors. Noting that hateful expression “rises beyond causing distress
to individual group members,”71 the Court wholeheartedly confirmed the necessity to
regulate the sort of speech that “seeks to delegitimize group members in the eyes of
the majority, reducing their social standing and acceptance within society”72.  If free
speech  is  an  American  exceptionalism,  then  multiculturalism  is  the  Canadian
equivalent  to  the  former.  It  appears  to  be  so  much so  to  the  extent  that  Canada’s
devotion  to  multiculturalism “necessitate(s)  a  departure  from the  view,  reasonably
prevalent  in  America  at  present,  that  the  suppression  of  hate  propaganda  is
incompatible with the guarantee of free expression”73. This is a direct suggestion by the
Court that multiculturalism is a constitutional principle74,  synonymous with equality
and standing tall next to speech freedom. Thus, Canada’s constitutional treatment of
hate  speech  resulted  in  the  elevation  of  what  many  discarded  as  a  mere  political
ideology into an actual constitutional precept that can take precedent over free speech
claim when that expression was judged to gnaw at the equal membership of fellow
Canadians. 
21  The Canadian commitment to communitarian perception of the harm in hate speech
and the undeterred striving for preservation of multiculturalism illustrate the nation’s
constitutional project’s inclination toward a group-based interpretation. The place for
group rights – and inextricable to it “a recognition that pluralism is one of Canada’s
animating values”75 - in Canadian legal context is not a novelty; rather, it has been a
distinctive  Canadian juridical  identity  in  the  making.  The indicative  list  of  implicit
Charter values provided in Oakes76 was a harbinger fertilizing the Canadian legal terrain
for fostering a constitutional atmosphere amicable to group rights. These entail the
“respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice
and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group
identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of
groups  in  society”77. In  addition  to  section  27  of  the  Charter78 that  registers
multiculturalism as a Canadian value, numerous sections are dedicated specifically in
respect  to  and  in  recognition  of  other  group  rights  such  as  minority  language
educational  rights  (s.23),  denominational  schools  (s.29),  and  even  extending  the
reconciliatory branch to the treaties with Aboriginal peoples (s.25). 
22  Surely, individual freedoms are important. But so are group rights in Canada. When a
freedom is distorted in such a way to disseminate and sow racially divisive messages,
that liberty is perceived as a menace to the collective moral fabric of Canadian society.
To protect the “cultural and group identity” through the prism of equality, there is no
room of tolerance for expressions that bluntly malign entire blocks of social groups
with  one  large  brush  without  offering  any  sort  of  critical  distinctions  nor
constructively  elevating  the  political  debate  for  the  matter  of  public  interest.
Constitutional rights belong to individual agents as much as they do to groups. As long
as the Supreme Court maintains the culturally pluralistic vision of Canadian society,
legislations  displaying  preferment  toward  collective  interests  are  likely  to  triumph
over free expression even at the cost of abandoning piercing individual expressions79. 
 
B/ - Narrow Doors to Speech Restrictions 
23  When it comes to the general acknowledgement of the harms in racist hate speech or
other  discriminatory  expression,  American  courts  seem  to  share  Canada’s  distaste.




suppression  purely  due  to  its  content  that  may  hurt  sensibilities  of  particular
communities.  Staying  true  to  the  spirit  embodied  in  the  Holmesian  tradition  of
marketplace and the utmost respect to individuals’ autonomy to express and pursue
whatever  ideas  they  please,  attempts  to  somehow  frame  or  criminalize  certain
expressions were met with great backlash from U.S. courts. Over the course of the last
century, the First Amendment jurisprudence has developed a series of elaborate rules
that  would  satisfy  the  necessary  constitutional  bar  when restraining  speech.  Given
their  aged  rulings,  there  is  valid  criticism that  their  mode  of  applicability  may  be
outdated to adequate address the rising challenges in the field. This concern pertains
specifically with regard to the complexities resulting from technological advancement,
ways of mass communication, and most problematically, the continuously self-evolving
uses of the Internet’s social networks. That being said, the principles excavated from
these  cases  have  retained  much  of  their  initial  influence  in  addressing  modern
constitutional challenges related to the treatment of hate speech issue in American law.
24  The early years of free speech jurisprudence was marked by what many would criticize
for failing to live up to today’s  democratic  standards,  and understandably so when
considering the extraordinary circumstances of a nation engaged in wars abroad at the
time. Nevertheless, the decisions provided clear directions to show legally sufficient
basis when suppressing speech activity. Schenck v. United States80 introduced one such
‘test’.  In  a  unanimous  decision,  the  Supreme  Court  upheld  the  conviction  of  the
defendant for violating the Espionage Act of 1917 by mailing thousands of pamphlets to
drafted soldiers in which he essentially accused the government to have no right to
send American citizens to fight war abroad. The Court embraced a contextual approach
by evaluating whether the words in the leaflets were used in such circumstances and
nature as to create a “clear and present danger”81. The reasoning in Schenck was later
extended to Abrams v. United States82,  in which defendants’ distribution of pamphlets
denouncing the government, capitalism and military intervention abroad in bellicose
environment was judged as an expression that which the Congress has a right to forbid.
The “clear and present danger” would eventually be somewhat discarded in Gitlow v.
New York83, in which the Supreme Court upheld a New York state statute that struck
down the publication of utterances having the tendency to create danger to the public
(in  the  case,  manifesto  encouraging  to  overthrow  the  government)  even  if  the
expression in question did not cause immediate clear and present danger. Whitney v.
California84 would expanded on this ‘bad or dangerous tendency’ criteria,  deeming it
sufficient  ground  for  denying  the  constitutional  shield  of  the  First  Amendment.
Although these cases occurred in unstable times in terms of America’s involvement in
major  international  conflicts  and  clashing  political  ideologies,  it  nevertheless
illustrates  that  the  courts  were  already  abiding  to  a  set  of  peremptory  yet  clearly
framed rules to constitutionally justify infringing on dissenting speech. 
25  This adherence to stringent requirement was greeted with renewed conditions that
introduced further rigidity in cases concerning display of historically racist expression.
In Brandenburg v. Ohio85, it was held that regardless of how inflammatory a speech may
be, it could not be justifiably subdued unless it is “directed at inciting or producing
imminent lawless action”86. Pronouncing in per curiam, the decision effectively reversed
Schenck condensing  the  speech  suppression  test  even  more  narrowly.  Cohen  v.
California87 further tightened access to speech restriction in a  case that  involved an




offensive enough to earn the wearer a criminal conviction under a California statute for
disturbing  public  peace.  The  Supreme  Court  quashed  the  conviction,  judging  the
expression worn by the defendant as not inciting nor threatening to commit any acts of
violence nor being part of the list of the “fighting words” enunciated in Chaplinsky88.
Operating a distinction between speech and conduct in the involved question, the Court
emphasized on the ideal of marketplace of ideas: the presence of dissenting or often
uncivil  words  is  “not  a  sign  of  weakness  but  of  strength”89;  and  that  “one  man’s
vulgarity  is  another  man’s  lyric”90.  Despite  the  concern  raised  with  regard  to  the
onlookers’ offended sensibilities as captive audience, that argument did not constitute
a compelling enough basis to prohibit the protester’s freedom of expression in the eyes
of the Court.
26  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul91 elevated the bar for speech inhibition by reaffirming the two
pillar principles of the First Amendment: content neutrality and view-point selectivity.
In declaring unconstitutional a local ordinance prohibiting speech that “arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others … on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender”92,
Justice Scalia delivered a scathing rebuke for operating “special prohibitions on those
speakers who express their views on disfavored subjects”93. The ordinance had to pack
a subsequent punch for exercising selectivity for having “proscribed fighting words of
whatever manner”94 (as opposed to the “particularly intolerable mode of expressing
whatever  idea  the  speaker  wishes  to  convey)  that  can result  in  “handicap(ing)  the
expression of particular ideas”95. One modern hate speech case involving quite similar
circumstantial elements (cross burning) to R.A.V. was Virginia v. Black96. In this case, the
Supreme Court toned down the tenacity demonstrated in R.A.V. by upholding that a
state could constitutionally enforce a content-based restriction on true threats if the
expressive activity was tainted with intent to intimidate97.
27  These  key  rulings  have  largely  defined  the  American  law’s  dealing  with  improper
speech ranging from political dissents to expressions of incivility to racially charged
conducts. But when it comes to comparing the U.S.-Canada historical treatment of hate
speech, none of these cases come as close to Collin v. Smith98 which offers images simply
inconceivable  in  Canadian  freedom  of  expression  constitutionalism.  The  judicial
drama99 that  unfolded surrounding the Village of  Skokie,  in  my opinion,  offers  the
starkest contrast yet that stretched the very boundaries of free speech. 
28  The incident in Skokie was, for the lack of better words, an ugly one: it involved the
National Socialist party’s threat to publicly march wearing SS uniforms in a Chicago
suburb that was predominantly inhabited by Jewish population - among whom many
were survivors of  the Nazi  atrocities.  Combined to this  were other tactics  of  visual
intimidation deployed by the organized protesters who swarmed the entire Northshore
surrounding  area  of  Chicago  with  thousands  of  leaflets  that  read  in  part  “We  Are
Coming” with degrading pictures of Swastika chocking a stereotype Jew. Nobody would
have predicted that a similar situation would recur in Charlottesville, Virginia, thirty-
nine years later. But as Mark Twain understood it best, “history does not repeat itself,
but it rhymes”100. Filled with oleaginous chants of “Blood and Soil” and “Jews Will Not
Replace Us” by tiki torches-wielding white nationalists, Kessler’s 2017 ‘Unite The Right’
rally101 had momentarily resurrected the ghastly remnants of Skokie102.
29  Setting aside all the circumstantial intricacy and upstaged political points to garner
national outrage, the constitutional challenge brought forth in Collins, I’m inclined to




Canadian social context, the outcome of Collins would have yielded quite a different
result because such expressive activity would have been a representation of ignominy
to the equality-driven mentality of the Charter but also an outright betrayal of what
ideal of freedom of expression embodies. Even when mirrored against their own free
speech theories, the expression in Collins in question utterly fails104. So here lies another
Canadian  fracture  from  the  First  Amendment  jurisprudential  management  of  hate
speech: Canadian freedom of expression appears malleable in its scope105,  leaving an
overture to adjusting its fundamental practicability to a reasonable degree. This implies
that freedom of expression is conscious and considerate with respect to the sensibility
harms  posed  by  certain  types  of  community-debasing  expressions  to  the  different
multi-ethnic  components  of  Canadian  society.  In  contrast,  free  speech  in  America
seems to hold its ground, unwilling to concede an inch of constitutional leverage. For
those feeling left uncomfortable, they need only “avert their eyes”106. 
*
Concluding remarks
30  It  is  unarguable  that  there  is  a  lot  to  learn from the  First  Amendment’s  historical
evolution.  But  Canada  and  the  United  States  are  not,  reckoning  the  long  list  of
overlapping similarities  in  cultural  and democratic  values,  same countries.  Varying
process  of  coming-to-be  and  Canada’s  promotion  of  its  culturally  pluralistic-driven
constitutional  image  necessarily  imply  different  jurisprudential  methodology  and
application of the very concept of the freedom itself. Defining the confines of a freedom
inevitably places it in cross-paths of other freedoms. In this stage of reconfiguration of
rights,  Canada  has  confided  in  communitarian  ideals  to  attenuate  expressions  that
violate  the  acceptable  demarcations  of  collective  civility  on one hand,  and thereby
sculpt an egalitarian conception of rights that is unmistakably Canadian on the other.
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ABSTRACTS
The  present  article  explores  the constitutional  treatment  of  hate  speech  in  Canadian  and
American  law  vis-à-vis  the  paramount  place  freedom  of  expression  occupies  in  both  legal
systems1. The author first pronounces on the conceptional divergence of the freedom, opining
that American free speech has retained much of its status as a preferred freedom given its unique
historical  fomenting process  and predilection toward a  quasi-absolutist  interpretation of  the
First Amendment. Canada, however, has explicitly declined to institute a hierarchical approach
of rights, thus effectively creating a level-playing field through an egalitarian-driven perception
of  rights  when  they  are  in  collision.  The  argument  continues  by  looking  into  major
jurisprudential  developments  of  hate  speech  in  the  two  respective  constitutional  orders.
Identifying one of the principal legal  basis  for Canadian courts to strike down constitutional
challenges  raised  in  hate  speech  cases  to  be  strongly  grounded  in  the  communitarian
understanding of the harm inflicted by hate speech, the observation hints at the distinctively
Canadian legal attitude’s overture toward special group rights, multiculturalism, or grosso modo –
the promotion of pluralism. The American courts, however, have been reluctant in suppressing
speech activity by confiding in a set of extremely narrowly tailored tests to justify constitutional
infringements of free speech.
Le présent article analyse le traitement constitutionnel des discours de haine en droit canadien
et étatsunien, notamment au regard de la place prépondérante qu'occupe la liberté d'expression
dans  les  deux  systèmes  juridiques.  L'auteur  se  prononce  d'abord  sur  les  divergences
conceptuelles,  estimant que la liberté d'expression aux États-Unis demeure largement conçue
comme une liberté privilégiée, compte tenu de son rôle historique unique et de la tendance à une
interprétation quasi absolutiste du Premier Amendement. Le Canada a quant à lui explicitement
refusé  d'instituer  une approche hiérarchique des  droits,  permettant  aux prétoires  d’être  des
terrains neutres où s’exerce une perception égalitaire des droits en cas de conflit de normes. La
démonstration  de  l’auteur  se  poursuit  en  examinant  les  développements  jurisprudentiels
majeurs relatifs aux discours de haine dans les deux systèmes juridiques respectifs.  Une telle
analyse conduit à identifier l’appréhension communautaire des préjudices causés par le discours
de haine comme étant l'un des principaux arguments permettant aux tribunaux canadiens de
faire obstacle aux éléments de défense soulevés dans les cas de discours haineux. Ce constat fait




multiculturalisme ou, grosso modo, à la promotion du pluralisme. De manière plus nuancée, les
tribunaux étatsuniens hésitent à restreindre la liberté de parole et se fondent par conséquent sur
un ensemble de tests d’interprétation stricte pour justifier d’éventuelles atteintes à la liberté
d'expression constitutionnellement garantie.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Liberté d’expression, discours de haine, Canada, États-Unis, préjudice, restriction,
multiculturalisme
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